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This paper investigates inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium, taking advantage of access to a 
unique matched employer-employee data set covering the period 1995-2002. Findings show the 
existence of large and persistent wage differentials among workers with the same observed 
characteristics and working conditions, employed in different sectors. The hypothesis that workers 
with better unmeasured abilities are over-represented in high-wage sectors may not be rejected on 
the basis of Martins’ (2004) methodology. However, the contribution of this explanation to the 
observed industry wage differentials appears to be limited. Further results show that ceteris paribus, 
workers earn significantly higher wages when employed in more profitable firms. Our instrumented 
wage-profit elasticity stands at 0.063 and Lester’s range of pay is about 41 per cent of the mean 
wage. This rent-sharing phenomenon accounts for a large fraction of the industry wage differentials. 
We find indeed that the magnitude, dispersion and significance of industry wage differentials 
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1.INTRODUCTION
The empirical debate about the causes of earnings inequalities was reopened at the end of the
1980s by an article by Krueger and Summers (1988). The authors highlighted the fact that the
structure of wages in the US was not compatible with the competitive framework, according
to which wage differentials in equilibrium are explained either through differences in the
quality of the labour force – measured in terms of productive capacity – or by so-called
compensating differences. In other words, they showed that wage disparities persisted
between agents with identical observed individual characteristics and working conditions,
employed in different sectors. Since then, similar results have been obtained for many
industrialised countries (Araï et al., 1996; Ferro-Luzzi, 1994; Hartog et al., 1997, 2000;
Lucifora, 1993; Vaïniomaki and Laaksonen, 1995). Accordingly, the existence of sectoral
effects on workers’ wages has become an accepted fact in the economic literature. Yet, the
role of unmeasured abilities in explaining the inter-industry wage differentials is still unsettled
(Abowd et al., 1999; Benito, 2000; Bjorklund et al., 2004; Carruth et al., 2004, Gibbons and
Katz, 1992; Goux and Maurin, 1999, Martins, 2004). Moreover, while studies on industry
wage premia offer some evidence against the perfectly competitive model, they hardly allow
to discriminate among alternative models supporting the existence of an effect of the
employer’s characteristics on wages (Benito, 2000; Krueger and Summers, 1988; Lindbeck
and Snower, 1990; Thaler, 1989; Walsh, 1999). In particular, little is known on the
contribution of rent-sharing to the observed industry wage differentials.
The present paper adds to this literature by examining the structure, stability and possible
sources of industry wage differentials in the Belgian private sector over the period 1995-2002.
The existence of inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium, for both male and female
workers, has been recently highlighted by Rycx (2002) and Rycx and Tojerow (2002). Using
cross-sectional data for 1995, the latter show that their structure is comparable with that
observed in the other industrialised countries and that they result in part from the
characteristics of the employers in each sector. Moreover, findings support the hypothesis of a
negative relation between the dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials and the degree of
corporatism of the industrialised countries. The role of unions in bringing about these inter-
industry wage differentials has been investigated by Rycx (2003). His findings, based on
micro-data for 1995, suggest that: i) sectors offering high/low wages are similar for workers
covered by different bargaining regimes, and ii) the dispersion of inter-industry wage2
differentials is higher when wages are collectively renegotiated at the firm level. Yet, many
uncertainties remain about the size, evolution and appropriate theoretical interpretation of the
industry wage differentials in Belgium. This paper aims to partially fill this gap by addressing
the following questions:
i) Are sectoral differences in pay a temporary phenomenon or do they persist over time?
ii) Do they derive from sectoral differences in the unobserved quality of the labour force?
iii) To what extent are they shaped by the sectors’ ‘ability to pay’, i.e. profits?
iv) What is the contribution of rent-sharing – i.e. the elasticity between wages and profits
at the firm level – to the observed industry wage differentials?
To address these questions, we rely on a unique matched employer-employee data set. This
data set derives from the combination of the Structure of Earnings Survey and the Structure of
Business Survey for the years 1995, 1999 and 2002. The former contains detailed information
on firm characteristics (e.g. sector of activity, size of the firm, and level of wage bargaining)
and on individual workers (e.g. gross hourly wages, bonuses, age, education, sex, and
occupation). The latter provides firm- and sector-level information on financial variables (e.g.
gross operating surplus, value added, and value of production).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section a brief review of the
literature on the magnitude and sources of industry wage differentials is presented. Section 3
describes the data used in the paper and displays summary statistics. Section 4 examines the
size, dispersion and stability of industry wage differentials in the Belgian private sector over
the period 1995-2002. The unobserved quality explanation of industry wage differentials is
tested in section 5. Section 6 analyses whether industry wage differentials result from sectoral
differences in ‘ability to pay’, i.e. profits. The firm-level elasticity between wages and profits
and the contribution of rent-sharing to the observed industry wage differentials are examined
in section 7. The last section concludes.3
2.THEORETICAL ANDEMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
According to the standard Walrasian (competitive) model of the labour market, where the
equilibrium wage is determined through marginal productivity, two agents with identical
productive characteristics necessarily receive the same wages. However, so-called
compensating differences may occur between similar individuals placed in different working
conditions. Indeed, the disutility undergone by one individual following the performance of a
task in an unfavourable situation may lead to wage compensation. This simple description of
the wage determination process has been challenged by the pioneering observations of
Slichter (1950) and more recently by Dickens and Katz (1987), Krueger and Summers (1987,
1988), and Katz and Summers (1989). These authors demonstrated that pay differentials
existed in the US between workers with the same observable individual characteristics and
working conditions employed in different sectors. In recent years, comparable results have
been obtained for a large number of countries (Araï et al., 1996; Ferro-Luzzi, 1994; Hartog et
al., 1997; Lucifora, 1993; Vainiomäki and Laaksonen, 1995). Moreover, it has been shown
that the structure of the industry wage differentials is quite stable over time (Helwege, 1992),
and similar across the industrialised countries (Zanchi, 1992). A number of studies, except
that of Bjorklund et al. (2004), suggest in addition that sectoral effects are significantly
weaker in strongly corporatist countries, regardless of the period studied (Edin and Zetterberg,
1992; Gannon et al., 2005; Hartog et al. 2000; Kahn, 1998; Teulings and Hartog, 1998;
Zweimüller and Barth, 1994). Teulings and Hartog (1998), for example, report that from the
most to the least corporatist country the dispersion in industry wage premia increases roughly
at a ratio of 1:4. The concept of corporatism, borrowed from political science, resembles the
level of centralisation of collective bargaining as well as the degree of co-ordination between
the social partners. However, as this concept has not been defined in one single way, there are
differences in opinion as to the relative position of the industrialised countries on the scale of
corporatism (OECD, 1997, 2004). The Scandinavian countries and Austria are nevertheless
always in the category of strongly corporatist countries, whereas the US and Canada are
invariably at the bottom of the ranking. Depending on the authors, Belgium is ranked
intermediate or high on the scale of corporatism.
Overall, the existence of sectoral wage premia cast increasingly doubt on the assumption of a
perfectly competitive labour market. Indeed, they suggest that individual wages are not solely
determined by personal productive characteristics and task descriptions but also by the4
features of the employers in each sector. Nevertheless, many uncertainties remain. One of
these derives from the fact that the unobserved quality of the labour force might not be
randomly distributed among industries. In other words, high-paying industries might simply
be those in which the unmeasured labour quality is the highest. Using the 1984 and 1986
Displaced Workers Surveys, Gibbons and Katz (1992) show for the US that the magnitude of
the industry wage differentials is almost undiminished when estimating wage equations in
first differences rather than in levels. Their findings thus indicate that the workers’ sectoral
affiliation does matter. The unobserved quality explanation has also been tested by Martins
(2004). Applying quantile regressions to a Portuguese matched employer-employee data set
from 1995, the author rejects the hypothesis that high-wage industries draw disproportionately
more on high-ability workers. Therefore, he suggests that non-competitive forces may play an
important role in the wage determination process. In contrast, findings of Goux and Maurin
(1999) and Abowd et al. (1999) show that individual fixed effects explain a large fraction of
the estimated inter-industry wage differentials in France. A similar result has been found by
Benito (2000) using individual-level data from the British Household Panel Survey for 1991
and 1994, respectively. All in all, there is no consensus regarding to exact scale of the
industry wage premia. Moreover, while studies on industry wage premia offer some evidence
against the perfectly competitive model, they hardly allow to discriminate among alternative
models supporting the existence of an effect of the employer’s characteristics on wages
(Benito, 2000; Krueger and Summers, 1988; Lindbeck and Snower, 1990; Thaler, 1989;
Walsh, 1999).
Prima facie, wage disparities observed between sectors militate in favour of the efficiency
wage theory. Indeed, the latter shows that if the incentive conditions for effort vary between
sectors, then two individuals with identical individuals characteristics, placed in the same
working conditions are likely to earn different wages. For instance, according to the effort
version of the efficiency wage theory, big companies would find it in their interests to offer
relatively higher wages to their employees because they face higher costs in order to monitor
the effort of the latter. However, this theory does not make it clear why the scale of the inter-
industry wage differentials varies between countries and appears to be more compressed in
corporatist countries. The constraints encouraging companies to pay efficient wages, i.e.
wages above the competitive level, actually seem to be similar among the industrialised
countries. Therefore, some authors (Hartog et al., 1997) believe that the justification put
forward by Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991), based upon the rent-sharing theory, is more5
compelling. The latter showed that the influence of the sectoral conditions (variations in
prices and productivity) on wages is strong in the US, moderate in Germany and low in the
Scandinavian countries. The elasticity between the sectoral environment and wages would
thus be more pronounced in the non-corporatist countries. To put it another way, the
determination of wages would depend more on the general macro-economic conditions in the
corporatist countries. This result might be explained by the fact that the explicit or implicit co-
ordination of the wage bargaining in the corporatist countries restricts the insider power of the
workers, in other words their ability to capture part of the sectoral rents. In addition, it is
argued that the policy of ‘wage solidarity’ pursued by unions in most of the corporatist
countries reinforces this phenomenon. For instance, Vainiomäki and Laaksonen (1995: 172)
emphasise that ‘the difference (in the dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials) between
Sweden and Finland (may derive from) the less successful implementation of solidarity wage
policy and more flexibility in industry level agreements in Finland’. In sum, this strand of the
literature suggests that rent-sharing is partly responsible for the observed sectoral wage
premia and for their apparently higher dispersion in non-corporatist countries.
However, a more convincing test of the rent-sharing theory is provided by studies focussing
directly on the wage-profit elasticity using firm level data (Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; Araï,
2003; Blanchflower et al., 1996; Christophides and Oswald, 1992; Fakhfakh and FitzRoy,
2004; Goos and Konings, 2001; Gürtzgen, 2005; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997; Margolis and
Salvanes, 2001; Rycx and Tojerow, 2004; Teal, 1996; Van Reenen, 1996). The theoretical
approach in these studies is a bargaining framework (often the right-to-manage or the efficient
bargaining model) in which insiders (not necessarily a union) bargain over wages and
eventually employment. Findings from this literature show that profitable firms pay higher
wages even when controlling for human capital characteristics and firm fixed effects.
Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether the magnitude of the pay-profit elasticity is larger in
countries with little centralisation or corporatism. Moreover, the assessment of how rent-
sharing contributes to the industry wage differentials is yet to be performed.
3.DESCRIPTION OF THEDATA
The present study is based upon the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) and the Structure of
Business Survey (SBS) carried out by Statistics Belgium. The SES, currently available for the
years 1995, 1999 and 2002, is a large matched worker-firm data set. It covers the Belgian6
establishments employing at least ten workers whose economic activities fall within section C
to K of the Nace Rev. 1 nomenclature. It thus encompasses the following sectors: mining and
quarrying (C), manufacturing (D), electricity and water supply (E), construction (F),
wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household
goods (G), hotels and restaurants (H), transport, storage and communication (I), financial
intermediation (J), real estate, renting and business activities (K). The survey contains a
wealth of information, provided by the management of the establishments, both on
establishment-level characteristics (e.g. sector of activity, region, size of the establishment,
and level of wage bargaining) and individual workers (e.g. education, potential experience,
seniority, number of working hours paid, gender, occupation, and gross hourly wages
including and excluding annual bonuses
1). Gross hourly wages – excluding bonuses
2 – are
calculated by dividing total gross earnings (including earnings for overtime hours and
premiums for shift work, night work and/or weekend work) in the reference period (October)
by the corresponding number of total paid hours (including paid overtime hours). In contrast,
gross hourly wages – including bonuses – are obtained by adding to the gross hourly wages
(exluding bonuses) the annual bonuses divided by: i) the number of month to which the
bonuses correspond and ii) the number of total paid hours in the reference period,
respectively. Potential experience is not directly reported in the SES. It is computed as
follows: age – 6 – years of education – seniority. It measures the number of years of
experience potentially accumulated on the labour market before the last job.
3
The 1995 wave of the SES was conducted using a representative sample of 145,107
individuals working for 6,015 establishments. Yet, the simultaneous use of data relating to
wages and levels of education yield a representative sub-sample of 81,562 individuals
working for 4,092 establishments.
4 After the exclusion of individuals for whom one of the
variables used entailed an incorrect or missing observation
5, the number of individuals in the
1 Information on annual bonuses is only available for 1995 and 2002.
2 Annual bonuses include irregular payments which do not occur during each pay period, such as pay for
holiday, 13
th month or profit-sharing.
3 This variable should be considered with caution since it overestimates the labour market experience of
individuals that have been employed part-time or had carrier breaks.
4 The representative character of this sub-sample is illustrated in Demunter (2000) and Rycx (2002).
5 Observations in which tenure was greater than worker’s age were deleted. This reduces the sample size by
1.4%. Records with missing values for the level of wage bargaining or the variable showing whether the7
sample falls by approximately 2.1% to 79,835 units. Finally, the exclusive selection of
establishments that are at least 50 per cent owned by the private sector brings the definitive
sample to 67,023 individuals. This selection is justified by the fact that the wages are
determined in very different ways in the public and private sectors. Taking into account
establishments where economic and financial control is primarily in public hands would in
fact be liable to skew our results. A similar filtering process has been applied to the 1999 and
2002 waves of the SES. The initial surveys include respectively 124,272 and 108,677
observations. However, the exclusion of incorrect or missing values and the selection of
establishment that are at least 50 per cent owned by the private sector bring the definitive
samples respectively to 111,297 and 102,594 individuals.
The SES provides no financial information. However, one of the objectives of this paper is to
examine the relationship between wages and profits, both at the sectoral and firm level.
Indeed, on the one hand, we want to analyse whether industry wage differentials result from
sectoral differences in ‘ability to pay’, i.e. profits (section 6). On the other, we wish to
estimate the elasticity between wages and profits at the firm level and measure the
contribution of rent-sharing to the observed industry wage differentials (section 7). To attain
these goals the SES has been merged with the Structure of Business Survey (SBS), at the
sectoral level in section 6 and the firm level in section 7. The SBS, conducted by Statistics
Belgium, provides information on financial variables such as sales, value added, value of
production, gross operating surplus and value of acquired goods and services. It is available at
the sectoral level (Nace three-digit nomenclature) in 1995, 1999 and 2002. At the firm level, it
could only be obtained for the year 1995. The coverage of the SBS differs from the SES in
that it does not include the financial sector (Nace J). Moreover, when it is merged to the SES
at the firm level (section 7), many observations are lost. The final sample, combining the SES
and the SBS at the firm level in 1995, covers 34,972 individuals working for 1,501 firms. It is
representative of all firms employing at least 20 workers within sections C to K of the Nace
Rev.1 nomenclature, with the exception of the financial sector.
individual supervises the work of his co-workers were suppressed. However, it can be shown that results
presented in this article would not have been significantly different if these observations had been taken into
account.8
Table 1: Means (Standard Deviations) of Selected Variables
Variables / Data set: SES
a 1995 SES  1999  SES  2002












Higher non-university short type, higher artistic training
















































































Level of wage bargaining:
CA
e only at the national and/or sectoral level











Number of observations 67,023 108,677 102,594
Notes: The descriptive statistics refer to the weighted sample.
a SES stands for Structure of Earnings Survey.
b Includes overtime paid and premia for shift work, night work and/or weekend work. Pay for holiday, 13
th
month, arrears, advances, travelling expenses etc. are excluded.
c Experience potentially accumulated on the
labour market before the last job.
d Number of hours paid in the reference period (October), including overtime
paid.
e CA stands for collective agreement.
Table 1 depicts the means and standard deviations of selected variables in the 1995, 1999 and
2002 waves of the SES.
6 We note that, on average, the gross hourly wage (excluding bonuses)
amounts to 13 EUR, three-quarters of the workers have at most a degree from the upper
secondary school, workers have 10 years of potential experience and 9 years of seniority, the
proportion of women is slightly less than one-third, and more than 95 per cent of the workers
are employed on an unlimited-term employment contract. Also noteworthy is that the number
of hours paid per month (including overtime) has been decreasing from 161 in 1995 to 154 in
2002. Moreover, we find that the average establishment size has been increasing over time
6 For a more detailed description see Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics relative to the merged SES-SBS sample
at the firm level in 1995 are reported in Appendix 2.9
(652 in 2002 vs. 502 in 1995) and that the majority of the workforce is employed in Flanders
(62 per cent in 2002). Finally, let us notice that the proportion of workers whose wages are
collectively renegotiated at the company level has been decreasing from approximately 39 to
20 per cent between 1995 and 2002. The majority of workers have their wages thus solely
determined through national and/or sectoral collective agreements.
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Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply (40)
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (23)
Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security (66)
Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding (65)
Post and telecommunications (64)
Manufacture of radio & television equipment (32)
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation (67)
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (24)
Computer and related activities (72)
Research and development (73)
Air transport (62)
Collection, purification and distribution of water (41)
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media (22)
Wholesale trade and commission trade  (51)
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. (31)
Manufacture of basic metals (27)
Renting of machinery and equipment (71)
Manufacture of other transport equipment (35)
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34)
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (29)
Real estate activities (70)
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products (21)
Other businesses activities (74)
Water transport (61)
Manufacture of tobacco products  (16)
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (26)
Manufacture of office machinery and computers (30)
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments (33)
Supporting transport activities; travel agencies (63)
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products (25)
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (50)
Other mining and quarrying (14)
Manufacture of fabricated metal products (28)
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage (19)
Construction (45)
Recycling (37)
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur (18)
Retail trade; repair of personal and household goods (52)
Manufacture of textiles (17)
Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork  (20)
Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat (10)
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. (36)
Land transport; transport via pipelines (60)
Hotels and restaurants (55)
0% 3% 5% 8% 10% 13% 15% 18% 20%
Gross hourly wages, including bonuses (EUR) Employment shares (%)
Source: Structure of Earnings Survey, 2002.10
Figure 1 shows the distribution of employment across sectors as well as the mean gross
hourly wage (including bonuses) in each industry for the year 2002.
7 Findings indicate that
more than 30 per cent of the workers are concentrated in the three following sectors: i) other
business activities (11.1 per cent), ii) retail trade; repair of personal and household goods
(10.8 per cent), and iii) wholesale trade and commission trade (8.8 per cent). A large fraction
of the workforce is also employed in the other mining and quarrying sector (5 per cent), the
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products sector (4.7 per cent), and the financial
intermediation sector (4.1 per cent).
F i g u r e  1 reveals in addition that mean gross hourly wages (including bonuses) fluctuate
considerable across sectors. The best paying industry is the electricity, gas, steam and hot
water supply sector. The average worker there earns 27 EUR per hour. This sector is followed
by the manufacture of coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel industries (23.1 EUR), the
insurance and pension funding sector (21.6 EUR), the financial intermediation sector (21.4
EUR), and the post and telecommunications sector (21.2 EUR). The hotels and restaurant
sector is at the very bottom of the wage scale. The average worker’s hourly wage here is 9.5
EUR, almost 300 per cent less than that of the average worker in the best paying industry. At
the bottom of the scale, we likewise find land transport and transport via pipelines (11.1
EUR), manufacture of furniture (11.9 EUR), manufacture of wood and products of wood and
cork (12 EUR), manufacture of textiles (12.1 EUR), and retail trade, repair of personal and
household goods (12.1 EUR).
Where do these substantial gross wage differentials come from ? Can they be accounted for
solely by the sectoral heterogeneity in (observed and unobserved) workers productive
characteristics and working conditions, or do they also derive from the specific features of the
employers in each sector, e.g. profits ? These questions, among others, are analysed in the
remainder of this paper.
7 The same figure for the year 1995 is reported in Appendix 3.11
4.MAGNITUDE,DISPERSION ANDSTABILITY OFINDUSTRYWAGE DIFFERENTIALS
4.1. Methodology
The methodology that has been adopted to estimate the magnitude and dispersion of inter-
industry wage differentials in the Belgian private sector over the period 1995-2002 is
consistent with that of Krueger and Summers (1988). However, the standard errors of the
industry wage differentials have been corrected according to Zanchi (1998).
Overall, this strategy rests upon the estimation, for each period, of the following Mincer-type
(1974) wage equation:
¦   ¦ ¦    
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, ln H G \ E D                 (1)
where wi represents the gross hourly wage of the individual i (for i = 1, ..., N); X is the vector
of the individual characteristics of the workers and their working conditions (6 dummy
variables showing the highest completed level of education; prior potential experience, its
square and its cube; seniority within the current company and its square; sex; 22 occupational
dummies; number of hours paid; an indicator showing whether the individual is paid a bonus
for shift work, night-time and/or weekend work; a dummy for extra paid hours; 3 dummies
for the type of contract; and a dichotomic variable indicating whether the individual
supervises other workers
8); Y comprises dummy variables relating to the sectoral affiliation of
the individuals (nomenclature available both at the Nace two- and three-digit level) ; Z
contains employer’s characteristics (2 regional dummies indicating where the establishment is
located; the size of the establishment; and 2 dummies for the level of wage bargaining); D is
the intercept; E, \ and G are the parameters to be estimated and Hi is an error term (see
Appendix 1 for a detailed description of the variables).
8 This variable is only available in the 1995 wave of the SES.12
Technically, the computation of inter-industry wage differentials first of all involves
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1  (for k = 1,…, K+1) is the
sectoral employment share;
and then applying the formulae below:
S \    k k d ˆ       (for k = 1,…, K)                 (3)
S    1 K d
In order to test accurately hypotheses about the inter-industry wage differentials, the standard
errors of the original industry coefficients have been adjusted according to Zanchi (1998). To
put it differently, we first transformed the variance-covariance matrix found when estimating
equation (1) by ordinary least squares (OLS) as follows:
       c c   c    

 s e H s e H \ \ ˆ cov var ˆ cov var     (4)
where H is a ((K+1)xK) matrix constructed as the stack of a (KxK) identity matrix and a (1xK)
row of zeros, e is a ((K+1)x1) vector of ones, s represents the employment shares of the K first
industries, and   \ ˆ cov var  is the original variance-covariance matrix of the industry dummy
coefficients. Next, the correct estimates of the standard errors of the industry wage
differentials were obtained by taking the square roots of the diagonal elements of this
transformed variance-covariance matrix.
According to Zanchi (1998), the variability in industry wage differentials has been measured
by the standard deviation of the industry wage premia, adjusted for least squares sampling
error and weighted by sectoral employment shares. This summary statistic, further referred in13
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The dispersion in industry wage premia has also been assessed by the wage range in moving
from the lowest- to the highest-paying industry.
4.2. Wage Regressions
Before embarking upon the analysis of the effects of workers’ sectoral affiliation on wages,
we briefly discuss the results from equation (1) that has been estimated for each period by
OLS with White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
9
Table 2: Wage Regressions
(Dependent variable: Ln of individual gross hourly wages excluding annual bonuses)















General upper secondary 0.140** 0.105** 0.100**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Technical/Artistic/Prof. upper secondary 0.128** 0.118** 0.111**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Higher non-university short type, higher artistic training 0.221** 0.195** 0.192**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
University and non-univ. higher education, long type 0.383** 0.355** 0.332**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Post-graduate 0.510** 0.525** 0.478**
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
Prior potential experience:
Simple 0.016** 0.020** 0.017**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
9 Findings discussed in this sub-section are based on a wage equation where the dependent variable is the
individual gross hourly wage excluding annual bonuses. Results based on gross hourly wages including annual
bonuses are reported in the Appendix 4. The latter are quite similar to the former although the magnitude of
some regression coefficients may differ to some extent.14
Squared/10
2 -0.036** -0.066** -0.044**
(0.000) (0.005) (0.003)
Cubed/10
4 0.022* 0.075** 0.032**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
Seniority in the company:
Simple 0.017** 0.016** 0.017**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Squared/10




Female -0.116** -0.128** -0.121**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Supervises the work of his or her co-workers:
Yes 0.110** / /
(0.004)
Hours:
Ln of the number of hours paid, including overtime paid -0.000 -0.008* -0.023**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Bonus for shift work, night work and/or weekend work:
Yes 0.057** 0.031** 0.046**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Overtime paid:
Yes 0.024** 0.030** 0.035**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Contract:
Unlimited-term employment contract Reference
Limited-term employment contract -0.026** -0.086** -0.064**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Apprentice/Trainee contract -0.636** -0.831** -0.296**
(0.093) (0.072) (0.026)
Other employment contract -0.024 -0.039** -0.032**
(0.024) (0.008) (0.008)
Occupation (22 dummies) Yes Yes Yes
Sector of activity (respectively 174, 171 and 179 dummies) Yes Yes Yes
Region where the establishment is located:
Brussels Reference
Wallonia -0.036** -0.043** -0.022**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Flanders -0.037** -0.010** 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Size of the establishment:
Ln of the number of workers 0.029** 0.028** 0.028**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Level of collective wage agreement:
Only at the national and/or sectoral level Reference
Company level 0.022** 0.016** 0.030**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Other type of agreement -0.016** / -0.011
(0.004) (0.007)
Adjusted R² 0.713 0.659 0.623
F-test 535.5** 479.5** 405.0**
Number of observations 67,023 108,677 102,594
Notes: White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported between brackets. Results are
based on equation (1), estimated on the basis of the 1995, 1999 and 2002 Structure of Earnings Surveys.
**/*/°: coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.15
Results in Table 2 show, in line with human capital theory, that the level of education
exercises a substantial positive influence upon wages. However, the return on education
appears to have significantly decreased between 1995 and 2002. Indeed, compared to
someone with a primary education qualification (or no degree), the wage differential has
dropped from 15 to 10 per cent
10 for someone with a general upper secondary education, from
25 to 21 per cent for someone qualified on a short non-university higher education course,
from 47 to 39 per cent for someone with a long non-university or university higher education,
and from 67 to 61 per cent for an individual who has obtained a postgraduate degree.
11
Not surprisingly, we also see a concave relation between the wages and the general potential
experience of a worker on the labour market.
12 Initially, the return on an additional year of
experience stands at between 1.6 and 1.9 per cent, depending on the year under investigation.
However, it decreases progressively and becomes negative after around 30 years of
experience. All other things being equal, an individual with 29 years of experience obtains a
wage differential of approximately 20 per cent compared to the reference workers whose
gross hourly wage has increased from 6.2 to 8.9 Euros between 1995 and 2002. The
hypothesis of a bell-shaped relationship between wages and experience rests upon the idea
that the investment in human capital (specific training and accumulation by work) diminishes
over time and that the stock of human capital suffers from some degree of obsolescence. The
growing share of the relationship between wages and experience is explained essentially by
the evolution of individual productivity and partly by scale increases.
The relationship between wages and seniority in the company is also in the form of a bell.
However, the return on seniority decreases markedly less quickly than that on experience.
This difference can be explained through the almost automatic increase in wages as a function
of years of seniority (essentially for white-collar workers) and through the progression in the
earnings classification (i.e. promotion by seniority). It also illustrates the fact that companies
offer more rewards for the human capital specific to their working environment. Finally, these
10 Technically, this figure is obtained by taking the antilog (to base e) of the estimated dummy coefficient from
which 1 is subtracted (x 100). For more details see Gujarati (1995: 525).
11 However, the decrease in the return on education for postgraduates is not statistically significant (t=1.13).
12 The introduction of potential experience in the form of an order three polynomial rests upon the results of
Murphy and Welch (1990).16
results support the ‘turnover’ version of the efficiency wage theory (Stiglitz, 1974) according
to which companies grant a bonus to workers who are faithful to them.
The dummy variable relating to gender suggests that all other things being equal, women are
paid wages which are between 11 and 12 per cent lower than those of men. This result is in
line with the growing literature on the gender wage gap in Belgium. Jepsen (2001) shows, for
instance, on the basis of the 1994 and 1995 Panel Study of Belgian Households (PSBH), that
the sex wage gap between full-time workers stands at around 15 per cent and that only a small
part of it can be explained by gender differences in endowments. In contrast, using the 1995
Structure of Earnings Survey (SES), Plasman et al. (2001) suggest that the wage gap between
(all) men and women working in the Belgian private sector reaches almost 22 per cent and
that half of it is attributable to gender differences in working conditions, individual and firm
characteristics. Using the PSBH, Konings (2005) shows in addition that the gender wage gap
in the Belgian economy has been stable over the period 1998 - 2002 and that a substantial part
of it can be attributed to discrimination. Findings reported in Table 2 corroborate this
conclusion. Indeed, they show the existence of a persistent gender wage gap even after
controlling for individual and firm characteristics. To put it differently, they reject the
hypothesis of a ‘natural’ trend towards pay equality.
We likewise observe a wage differential of 11.6 per cent in favour of individuals supervising
the work of their co-workers. This result stems from the fact that all other things being equal,
these individuals have a higher degree of responsibility within the company. It also backs up
the ‘effort’ version of the efficiency wage theory (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). According to
this theory, it is optimal for a company to offer a bonus to employees whose effort it is not
able to monitor constantly, and to carry out intermittent checks with respect to them,
including dismissal in the event of insufficient effort. To sum up, these results suggest the
existence of a positive relationship between the wage of an individual and his degree of
autonomy at work. Notice that such a relationship has also been observed in other countries
(Araï, 1994; Groshen and Krueger, 1990).17
Table 2 reveals, in addition, that the number of hours has a negative but rather limited
influence on the gross hourly wage.
13 This result is in line with earlier work of Jepsen (2001)
and Jepsen et al. (2005). Both studies examine the wage penalty associated with part-time
employment in Belgium. Using respectively the PSBH and the SES, the authors find no sign
of a “within industry and occupational group” wage penalty against part-timers. However,
they report a substantial “market-wide” wage gap. These findings suggest that, although
discrimination legislation seems to be working, part-timers are segregated both at the
occupational and sectoral level.
The fact of putting in extra paid hours or being paid a bonus for non-typical working hours
(shift work, night work and/or weekend work) leads to an increase in hourly wages of around
3 and 5 per cent respectively compared to the reference category. Also noteworthy is that the
wage penalty of those employed on a limited-term employment contract has increased from
2.6 per cent in 1995 to 6.2 per cent in 2002 with respect to their opposite numbers with an
unlimited-term contract. The existence of a wage penalty against workers with a finite-term
contract is compatible with the proposal put forward by Harris and Holmström (1982).
According to this proposal, employers levy an amount on the wages of newcomers in order to
pay for their uncertainty as to their productive ability. Be that as it may, the reason why the
wage penalty against workers on a fixed-term contract has increased over time remains
unclear.
As regards establishment characteristics, we find that all other things being equal wages are
significantly lower in Wallonia and Flanders (except in 2002) than in Brussels. Yet, the
13 The regression coefficients relative to the number of hours and over-time hours should be interpreted with
caution. This is due to a potential endogeneity bias. Indeed, even if employees can not always freely choose their
working hours, the assumption of exogenous hours is too restrictive. To put it differently, the labour supply
decision might depend upon the potential market wage rate. An easy way to account for this potential bias is to
use instrumental variables representing the expected working hours of each employee. Following Wolf (2002), it
is extremely difficult to find appropriate instruments. Nonetheless, it has been conventional to use variables
describing the household context, such as the number of small children, the marital status and the other
household income. Unfortunately, these instruments are not reported in the SES. This is why controlling for the
endogeneity of working hours appears to be a very difficult task. However, this should not be a major limitation
for our purpose, i.e. examining inter-industry wage differentials. Findings show indeed that the inclusion of the
number of working hours and a dummy for over-time paid in the wage equation affects neither the significance
nor the magnitude of the other regression coefficients.18
magnitude of the differential is small and decreasing over time. Results also show the
existence of a significant and positive effect of the employer size on workers’ wages. Indeed,
they suggest that, on average, a doubling of the establishment-size increases earnings by 3 per
cent. Yet, according to Lallemand et al. (2005), a significant part this establishment-size wage
premium could be explained by the fact that the productivity and stability of the Belgian
workforce is higher in large establishments. Finally, it is found that workers covered by a
company collective agreement (CA) earn between 2 and 3 per cent more than their opposite
numbers whose wages are solely covered by national and/or sectoral CAs. These results fit in
with findings reported earlier by Rycx (2003) and Plasman et al. (2006).
Overall, results from our wage regressions are quite satisfactory. Indeed, a substantial part of
the total variation in individual hourly wages is explained by the regression model (i.e.
between 62 and 71 per cent, depending on the period considered). Moreover, most regression
coefficients are significant and they have the expected sign. Be that as it may, our estimates
might be slightly biased because of the fact that our sample is censored. In fact it does not
contain any information on the number of unemployed people or on their characteristics.
Docquier et al. (1999), Laurent (2000) and Jepsen (2001) have studied this problem in the
case of Belgium. Their results obtained using the PSBH suggest that the expected level of
earning is not significantly tied to the fact of having a job. The assessment of a censored
sample therefore would not lead to a significant selection bias in Belgium. Although this
result might derive from the low percentage of unemployed people included in their samples,
it does tend to back up our estimates.
4.3. Inter-Industry Wage Differentials
Table 3 reports the industry wage differentials for Nace two-digit industries in 1995, 1999 and
2002.
14 These differentials are estimated on the basis of equation (1) using as dependent
variable the log (to base e) of individual gross hourly wages excluding annual bonuses.
15
14 An identical analysis was carried out at the Nace three-digit level. The results arising from this, set out in the
Appendix 5, support and refine our conclusions.
15 Inter-industry wage differentials estimated, both at the Nace two- and three-digit level, on the basis of a wage
equation where the dependent variable includes annual bonuses are reported in Appendix 6 and 7. Taking into
account annual bonuses increases the magnitude and dispersion of the industry wage differentials. However, the
overall conclusion remains the same.19
Table 3: Inter-Industry Wage Differentials, 1995-2002
Industry (NACE two-digit) / Period: 1995 1999 2002
Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat (10) / / -0.157**
(0.022)





























Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage,







Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork, except






















































































Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments,













































Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; -0.031** 0.011* 0.021**20
retail sale of automotive fuel (50) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)








Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of









































































Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of

























Adjusted R² of the wage regression 0.701 0.648 0.613
F-test relative to the wage regression 1,191.9** 1,090.2** 884.4**
F-test relative to the sectoral dummies 137.6** 141.4** 116.3**








Number of industries 43 43 44
Number of observations 67,023 108,677 102,594
Notes: Inter-industry wage differentials are estimated on the basis of equation (1) where the dependent variable
is the ln of individual gross hourly wages excluding annual bonuses. Standard errors of the industry wage
differentials, computed according to Zanchi (1998), are reported between brackets. **/*/°: industry wage
differential significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
Results show, for all periods, the existence of substantial wage differentials between workers
employed in different sectors, even after controlling for a large number of individual and
establishment characteristics. These differentials are statistically significant at the 5 per cent
level, both in individual terms (with a few exceptions) and globally. We further note that the
hierarchy of the sectors in terms of wages is quite stable over time. Indeed, results reported in
Table 4 show that the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between the wage
differentials estimated in 1995, 1999 and 2002 reach at least 0.75, with a probability of being21
zero of less than 1 per cent.
16 These correlations suggest that the estimated wage differentials
between industrial sectors do not derive from transitory differences in demand across
industries.
Table 4: Pearson / Spearman Correlation Coefficients
Between Inter-Industry Wage Differentials
Period: 1995 2002




2002 0.805** / 0.780**
(n = 42)
Notes: Computation based on the inter-industry wage differentials reported in Table 2.
n stands for the number of sectors. **/*/°: coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively.
The best paying industry over the period 1995-2002 is the electricity, gas, steam and hot
water supply sector. Depending on the period considered, the average worker in this sector
earns ceteris paribus between 27 and 31 per cent
17 more than the average worker in the whole
economy. At the top of the conditional wage distribution, we also find the manufacture of
coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel industry (between +20 and 34 per cent), the
air transport sector (between +12 and 19 per cent), the manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products industry (between +11 and 12 per cent), and financial intermediaries,
except insurance and pension funding (between +6 and 13 per cent).
The hotel and restaurant sector is at the very bottom of the wage scale: the average worker’s
wage there is ceteris paribus between 11 and 14 per cent lower than that of the average
worker in the economy. At the bottom of the scale, we also find the manufacture of wearing
apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur (between -11 and -13 per cent), retail trade (between -7
16 Similar results are obtained when the inter-industry wage differentials are computed at the Nace three-digit
level and/or on the basis of a wage equation where the dependent variable is the gross hourly wage including
annual bonuses (see Appendix 8 and 9).
17 In order to get the difference in percentage between the wage (in EUR) of the average worker in sector k and
the employment-share weighted mean wage (in EUR) in the economy, the following expressions have been
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transformation, often omitted in the literature, is necessary because the estimated wage equation has a semi-
logarithmic form (for a discussion see Reilly and Zanchi, 2003).22
and -12 per cent), the manufacture of furniture (between -8 and -10 per cent), and the
manufacture of textiles (between -4 and -8 per cent).
If we compare these results with those obtained by Gannon et al. (2005) for six member states
of the European Union on the basis of the 1995 European Structure of Earnings Survey
(ESES), we find that the sectoral wage structure reported for Belgium is quite similar to that
observed in other industrialised countries. To put it differently, it appears that high- and low-
paying industries do not vary substantially across countries.




















Notes: Results are based on a wage equation where the dependent variable is the ln of individual gross hourly
wages excluding annual bonuses. WASD stands for weighted adjusted standard deviation of inter-industry wage
differentials. At the Nace two-digit level, the number of sectors varies between 42 and 43 depending on the year
considered. At the three-digit level, it fluctuates between 172 and 180.
What about the dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials ? Table 5 shows that the range
and weighted adjusted standard deviation (WASD) of the industry wage differentials
estimated in 1995, 1999 and 2002 at the Nace two- and three-digit level. Not surprisingly, it is
found that the dispersion in industry wage differentials grows significantly when the number
of sectors being considered increases. We also note that the WASD has steadily and
substantially decreased between 1995 and 2002, both at the Nace two- and three-digit level.
18
The explanation for this evolution is still unsettled. However, it could be related to the
European integration process and the deregulation of certain industries. If we compare our
results with those obtained for other industrialised countries (see, for example, Teulings and
Hartog, 1998), we find that Belgium occupies a middle position among the industrialised
countries with regard to the dispersion of the inter-industry wage differentials. The scale of
18 A similar result is found when inter-industry wage differentials are estimated on the basis of a wage equation
where the dependent variable is the ln of individual gross hourly wages including annual bonuses (see Appendix
6 and 7).23
the latter is indeed lower than in the Anglo-Saxon countries (UK, US and Canada) and higher
than those in the Scandinavian countries.
5.THE UNOBSERVED QUALITYEXPLANATION
Findings reported so far emphasize the existence of substantial and persistent wage
differentials among workers with the same observed characteristics, employed in different
sectors. At face value, these results are incompatible with the assumption of a perfectly
competitive labour market. Indeed, they suggest that individual wages are not solely
determined by personal productive characteristics and task descriptions but also by the
specific features of the employers in each sector. Yet, caution is required as industry wage
differentials may derive from the fact that the unobserved quality of the labour force is not
randomly distributed across sectors. In other words, high-paying industries might simply be
those in which the non-observed quality of the labour force is the highest.
Almost all studies examining the unobserved quality explanation rely on panel data. They
compute industry wage premia on the basis of a wage equation estimated in first-differences
so as to control for time-invariant unobserved individual ability. Results arising from these
studies are mixed. Krueger and Summers (1988), for example, show for the US that the
magnitude of the industry wage differentials is almost undiminished when estimating wage
equations in first-differences rather than in levels. A similar result has been reported by
Gibbons and Katz (1992) on the basis of US data from plant closings. In contrast, Murphy and
Topel (1990), Abowd et al. (1999) and Goux and Maurin (1999) show that individual fixed
effects explain a large fraction of the estimated industry wage differentials in the US and
France, respectively. Using longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey,
Benito (2000) and Carruth et al. (2004) also provide strong evidence in favour of the
unobserved quality explanation.
Longitudinal data allow to control for fixed unobserved individual characteristics. This is a
major advantage with respect to cross-sectional data. Yet, the use of panel data generates
specific problems that are not encountered with cross-sectional data. Indeed, first-difference
estimates may be biased if: i) the number of workers changing industry is small, ii) workers
who switch industry have non random characteristics, and iii) the unobserved labour quality is
not equally valued among industries. Fixed effects estimations are also more affected by24
measurement errors (i.e. errors in reporting changes in workers’ sectoral affiliation) since they
exclusively focus on individuals switching industry. A final issue concerns the return-to-
tenure component of the wage equation (Björklund et al., 2004). Indeed, it is argued that fixed
effects estimates are biased since the tenure effect is likely to be underestimated among
individuals who just switched industry.
To avoid the problems encountered with first-difference estimates, Björklund et al. (2004)
examined the role of unobserved ability in explaining inter-industry wage differentials using
data on siblings (brothers). The authors argue that industry wage premia computed from data
on siblings are more accurate than those estimated on the basis of individuals switching
industry because they do not depend on the exogenous job mobility assumption. Their results
show that unobserved ability accounts for approximately 50 per cent of the industry wage
dispersion in the US and for between 11 and 24 per cent in the Scandinavian countries.
Furthermore, in contrast to virtually all previous studies, the authors find that the contribution
of industry wage differentials to the overall wage variation is not significantly larger in the
US than in the Scandinavian countries, after controlling for unobserved factors common to
brothers.
The unobserved quality explanation has also been tested by Martins (2004). Applying
quantile regressions to a Portuguese matched employer-employee data set from 1995, the
author rejects the hypothesis that high-wage industries draw disproportionately more on high-
ability workers. Therefore, he concludes that non-competitive forces may play an important
role in the wage determination process.
5.1. Methodology
The unobserved ability hypothesis has never been tested for the Belgian economy. This is
partly due to the fact that linked employer-employee panel data are not available for Belgium.
In this section, we attempt to fill this gap by applying Martins’ (2004) methodology to the
1995 and 2002 Structure of Earnings Surveys. This boils down to estimate an extended wage
equation, controlling for a large number variables, at the mean and at the 10th and 90th25
percentiles of the wage distribution.
19 Martins’ methodology is based on the following
reasoning. On the one hand, workers with better unobserved characteristics (e.g. ability,
motivation, industry-specific skills) are likely to be found at the top of the conditional wage
distribution. On the other hand, according the unobserved quality explanation, workers with
better unmeasured characteristics are over-represented in high-wage sectors. As a result if the
unobserved quality explanation is valid, we would expect: i) industry wage differentials to be
larger at the top end of the wage distribution, ii) a bigger difference in industry wage premia
across the wage distribution in high-wage sectors than in low-wage sectors, and iii) a highly
positive correlation between industry wage differentials computed at the mean and at the 90th
percentile of the wage distribution (or equivalently, a strong positive correlation between the
mean premia and the difference between the premia at the top and bottom percentiles).
Our wage equation is specified as in section 4 (see equation (1)). The dependent variable is
the log (to base e) of individual gross hourly wages including bonuses. The inclusion of
bonuses is justified by the fact that they are likely to be affected by unobserved characteristics
(e.g. ability, motivation, industry-specific skills).
20 Among the explanatory variables we find:
i) a vector of workers’ individual characteristics and working conditions (6 dummy variables
showing the highest completed level of education; prior potential experience, its square and
its cube; seniority within the current company and its square; sex; 22 occupational dummies;
number of hours paid; an indicator showing whether the individual is paid a bonus for shift
work, night-time and/or weekend work; a dummy for extra paid hours; 3 dummies for the
type of contract; and a dichotomic variable indicating whether the individual supervises other
workers
21); ii) Nace two-digit dummy variables relating to the sectoral affiliation of the
workers; and iii) a vector of employer’s characteristics (2 regional dummies indicating where
19 We applied a method where the wage equation is calculated simultaneously at the 10th and 90th percentiles.
This method estimates a bootstrapped version of the variance-covariance matrix which enables to test whether
regression coefficients are significantly different across percentiles. Bootstrapped standard errors are better than
those computed analytically when estimating quantile regressions. This is due to the fact that the variance of the
error term is assumed to vary along the conditional wage distribution. For an extended description of quantile
regressions and bootstrapping see StataCorp (1999) and Wooldridge (2002).
20 Information on annual bonuses is not available in the 1999 wave of the SES. Therefore, our analysis focuses
exclusively on 1995 and 2002.
21 This variable is only available in the 1995 wave of the SES.26




Table 6 presents the industry wage coefficients at the 10th and 90th percentiles of the wage
distribution and the difference between the two percentiles at each industry in 2002. Results
show that almost 40 per cent of the industry wage differentials are not significantly different
(at the 5 per cent level) at the top and bottom of the conditional wage distribution. However,
on average industry wage premia are larger at the 90th percentile than at the 10th percentile
(0.106 vs. 0.063). Also noteworthy is that high-wage industries are characterised by bigger
differences in wage premia between the top and bottom percentiles. Indeed, the average
differential stands at 0.086 for the 15 best-paying industries (ranked according to the OLS
results), while the same average is equal to 0.011 for the 15 worse-paying industries. Final
results show the existence of a positive and significant relationship between mean industry
wage premia and differences in wage premia across the wage distribution.
Table 6: Industry Coefficients at the Top and Bottom Percentiles of the Wage
Distribution and their Difference, 2002
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Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and 0.134** 0.321** 0.187**
22 Results from the regressions can be obtained upon request.27
nuclear fuel (23) (0.017) (0.03) (0.036)
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Renting of machinery and equipment without operator 0.075** 0.109** 0.034*28
and of personal and household goods (71) (0.010) (0.01) (0.017)


















Means 0.063 0.106 0.044
Average difference for the 15 best-paying industries 0.086
Average difference for the 15 worse-paying industries 0.011
Per cent significant coefficients at the 5 per cent level 90.7% 86.0% 62.8%
Correlation between OLS and quantile regression
coefficients (Spearman) 0.702** 0.900** 0.324*
Correlation between OLS and quantile regression
coefficients (Pearson) 0.811** 0.916** 0.366*
Notes: Industry wage coefficients are estimated on the basis of equation (1) where the dependent variable is the
ln of individual gross hourly wages including annual bonuses. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported between
brackets (1000 iterations). **/*/°: coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
These findings are compatible with the unobserved ability hypothesis. Yet, caution is
required. Indeed, almost 40 per cent of the industry coefficients are not significantly larger at
the top end of the wage distribution. Moreover, top and bottom industry coefficients are
correlated with the same intensity to the mean industry wage premia. However, according to
the unobserved ability hypothesis, the correlation should have been non significant or at least
lower with the bottom percentile wage coefficients. A final concern is that the correlation
between mean and inter-percentile industry premia is smaller than expected (around 30 per
cent).
In sum, we may not reject the hypothesis that part of the industry wage differentials derives
from unobserved characteristics that are not randomly distributed across sectors. Yet, we
should recognise that results are not clear-cut. This tends to indicate that the contribution of
unobserved ability to the industry wage differentials is limited.
23
6.INDUSTRYWAGE DIFFERENTIALS ANDSECTORALHETEROGENEITY IN‘ABILITY TOPAY’
Findings so far show that substantial wage differentials exist between workers, with identical
observed individual characteristics and working conditions, employed in different sectors.
These differentials appear to be only partially compatible with the unobserved ability
hypothesis. Therefore, the role of non-competitive forces deserves to be addressed. The most
23 An identical analysis was carried out for the year 1995. The results arising from this, set out in the Appendix
10, support our conclusion.29
natural non-competitive explanation for the existence of industry wage premia is that they
result from inter-sectoral variations in ‘ability to pay’, i.e. profits. This explanation is
generally supported by the literature. For example, Kouwenberg and van Opstal (1999) show
that industry wage differentials in the Netherlands are positively and significantly correlated
to industry profits. A similar result is reported for the UK by Benito (2000) and for six
member states of the European Union by Gannon et al. (2005). Genre et al. (2005), on the
opposite, find no significant relationship between industry wage premia and sectoral profits in
the euro area. However, this may be due to some data shortcomings, in particular a high level
of aggregation.
In this section, we attempt to provide additional insights into the nature of industry wage
differentials in Belgium by considering their relation with industry profitability. Data on
profitability are taken from the Structure of Earnings Survey (SBS). Industry profitability is
estimated by the gross operation surplus per worker.




















Notes: Data on industry profitability are drawn from the Structure of Business Survey. The industry profitability
has been estimated by the industry level gross operating surplus per employee. Industry wage differentials have
been computed on the basis of equation (1) where the dependent variable is the ln of gross hourly wages
excluding annual bonuses. Similar results are found when the dependent variable includes annual bonuses (see
Appendix 11). **/*/°: coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
Table 7 shows that industry wage differentials are significantly and positively correlated with
industry profitability in all periods, both at the Nace two- and three digit level. The magnitude
of this correlation fluctuates between 0.302 and 0.645. It is not found to be significantly
different at the top and bottom of the conditional wage distribution (see Appendix 11).
Industry wage premia computed at the 10th and 90th percentiles of the wage distribution are
indeed correlated with the same intensity to industry profits.30
Table 8: OLS Regressions – The Effect of Industry Profitability on Industry Wage
Differentials at the Nace Three-Digit Level



















Dummy for 1999 - - - -0.001
(0.009)
Dummy for 2002 - - - -0.005
(0.009)
F-test 41.3** 51.3** 14.2** 29.75**
Adjusted R² 0.234 0.276 0.085 0.175
Number of observations 133 133 143 409
Notes: Industry wage differentials (at the Nace three-digit level) are the dependent variable. They have been
computed on the basis of equation (1) where the explained variable is the ln of gross hourly wage excluding
annual bonuses. The industry profitability has been estimated by the industry level gross operating surplus per
employee. White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported between brackets. **/*/°:
coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
These results are supported by cross-sectional regressions run for each period separately and
for all periods together (see Table 8). Regressions estimated by OLS with White (1980)
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors show that sectoral profits (at the Nace three-digit
level) have a positive and significant effect on industry wage premia.
24 Depending on the
period under investigation, we find that when sectoral profits-per-capita rise by 10,000 EUR
industry wage premia increase on average by between 0.0064 and 0.0186 log points. This
means that the wage premium of the average worker in a sector where profits-per-capita raise
by 10,000 EUR increases on average by between 1 and 2 percentage points with respect to the
average worker in the whole economy.
25 The magnitude of this effect is not found to vary
along the wage distribution (see Appendix 15). Finally, let us notice that the heterogeneity in
profits-per-capita across sectors explains between 8.5 and 27.6 per cent of the variability in
inter-industry wage differentials.
24 Similar results are obtained when industry wage differentials are computed at the Nace two-digit level and/or
on the basis of a wage equation where the dependent variable is the gross hourly wage including annual bonuses.
We also estimated our regression model using fixed effects. Results from this specification were not statistically
significant (see Appendix 12, 13 and 14). However, this is probably due to the fact that our variables do not very
much fluctuate over time.
25 Yet, the elasticity between industry wage premia and sectoral profits should be regarded with caution. Indeed,
it might be downward biased since by construction higher wages lead to lower profits. This issue is addressed in
the next section of the paper.31
All in all, results show that industry wage premia derive at least partly from sectoral
differences in ‘ability-to-pay’, i.e. profits. These results are consistent with several non-
competitive wage determination models, including efficiency wage mechanisms and rent-
sharing.
7.INDUSTRYWAGE DIFFERENTIALS ANDRENT-SHARING
In this section, we attempt to go a step further by examining to what extent industry wage
differentials are explained by a rent-sharing phenomenon. As far as we know, very little is
known on this issue. Our methodology boils down to compare (at different percentiles) the
magnitude and dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials estimated from two different
wage equations. The first one is the same as in section 4. It involves to regress individual
gross hourly wages on workers’ characteristics (e.g. education, potential experience, tenure,
sex, and occupation), working conditions (e.g. type of contract and working hours), industry
dummies (at the Nace two- and three-digit level), and employers’ features (e.g. size of the
establishment and level of wage bargaining). The second wage equation includes a
supplementary explanatory variable, i.e. firm level profits-per-employee. Controlling for this
additional variable requires to correct for group effects in the residuals and to use instrumental
variables to correct for the endogeneity of profits. The analysis in this section is based on the
combination of the SES and the SBS at the firm level in 1995.
26 Descriptive statistics relative
to this sample are reported in the Appendix 2.
Before examining the contribution of rent-sharing to the observed industry wage differentials,
we briefly present our estimates of the elasticity between wages and profits (at different
percentiles) as well as the underlying theoretical framework.
7.1. Theoretical Framework
Two models have become standard in the literature for the analysis of the impact of profits-
per-employee on wages in a bargaining framework. These are the right-to-manage and the
efficient bargaining models, so-named respectively by Nickell and Andrews (1983) and
26 Data from the SBS for 1999 and 2002 are only available at the sectoral level. Therefore, the analysis in this
section is restricted to the year 1995.32
McDonald and Solow (1981). In the right-to-manage model, firms unilaterally determine
employment, while wages are the result of a confrontation between the objectives of the firm
and of the employees. In the efficient bargaining model, bargaining takes place with respect to
both employment and wages. While both models yield identical wage equations, they differ
fundamentally in that in the former employment is endogenous with respect to wages whereas
in the latter it is exogenous. Nevertheless, they both suggest that wages are related to the
firm’s ability to pay, i.e. to the firm’s profitability.
27
In this section, we rely on the right-to-manage model.
28 Hence, suppose a bargaining situation
where a firm’s real profit function is given by:
  L W L R    3 (6)
with 3 the real profits, R(L) the real revenue, W the real wage and L the employment level.
Also consider a risk-neutral group of workers, not necessarily a union, which attempts to
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with N the number of members in the group (0  L d N) and A the outside option (W ! A). The
outside option is the expected value of real revenue perceived by an individual in the event of
redundancy. It depends positively on the unemployment benefit and on the expected real
wage that a worker would obtain elsewhere, and negatively on the unemployment rate.
27 See e.g. Pencavel (1991).
28 Using Belgian aggregate data from 1957 to 1988, Vannetelbosch (1996) has shown that both the right-to-
manage and the efficient bargaining models can be rejected in favour of the general bargaining model, developed
by Manning (1987). This means that the outcome of the bargaining process is located somewhere between the
labour demand curve and the contract curve. Nevertheless, this result must be considered with caution for at least
two reasons. First, the estimates are very sensitive to the specification of the reservation wage, and second, the
trade union density and the number of strikes are far from ideal as a surrogate for the relative bargaining power
of unions. This uncertainty is not very surprising since “the empirical literature has not yet been able to find an
appropriate test to distinguish between the principal models” (Booth, 1995: 141). Also noteworthy is that, while
these models have different implications for unemployment and economic welfare, they generate identical wage
equations. Hence, for the sake of simplicity, we have chosen to rely on the right-to-manage model.33
The model is solved backwards: the profit-maximizing firm determines the employment level,
given the bargained wage in the first stage of the game. The resulting deal is represented by
the maximisation of the generalised Nash bargain. This approach boils down to maximising
the weighted product of both parties’ net gain, i.e. the difference between levels of utility in
the event of an agreement and in the event of no agreement. For a company, without fixed
costs, the level of utility reached when bargaining fails equals zero. Indeed, since we assume
that all workers are affiliated to the group, the company will have to cease production if
agreement is not reached. The fallback position of a representative member of the group is
equal to A. Accordingly, the generalised Nash bargaining problem can be written as follows
29:
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with > @ 1 , 0  E the relative bargaining power of the workers in the wage bargain. The first
order condition of this problem is given by:
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   E (9)
Expression (9) suggests that real wages are affected by the outside option, real profits-per-
employee and the relative bargaining power of the workers.
7.2. Elasticity between Wages and Profits
The corresponding statistical specification, which will serve as a benchmark for our empirical
analysis, can be written as follows:
  ¦ ¦ ¦
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29 See Nickell (1999: 3) for a discussion on the notation.34
with wi the gross hourly wage of the individual i (i = 1,…, N); (3/L)f the amount of profit-per-
worker in firm f
30; X the vector of the individual characteristics of the workers and their
working conditions (6 dummy variables showing the highest completed level of education;
prior potential experience, its square and its cube; seniority within the current company and
its square; sex; 22 occupational dummies; number of hours paid; an indicator showing
whether the individual is paid a bonus for shift work, night-time and/or weekend work; a
dummy for extra paid hours; 3 dummies for the type of contract; and a dichotomic variable
indicating whether the individual supervises other workers); Y comprises dummy variables
relating to the sectoral affiliation of the individuals (nomenclature available both at the Nace
two- and three-digit level) ; Z contains employer’s characteristics (2 regional dummies
indicating where the establishment is located; the size of the establishment; and 2 dummies
for the level of wage bargaining); D is the intercept; Ȝ, E, \ and G are the parameters to be
estimated and Hi is an error term (see Appendix 2 for a detailed description of the variables).
31
Equation (10) has been estimated by OLS with White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors. Yet, a potential trap derives from the use of grouped observations and
individual data. Indeed, profits are computed at the firm level while wages are reported at the
worker level. This situation can bias the standard errors of our estimates and as a result distort
the significance of the regression coefficients. To account for these group effects, we applied
the correction for common variance components within groups, as suggested by Greenwald
(1983) and Moulton (1990).
32
30 Firm profits are approximated by the firm annual gross operating surplus, i.e. the difference between the value
added at factor costs and the total personnel expenses.
31 This specification is standard in the economic literature (see e.g. Nekby, 2003). However, it could be argued
that specific variables representing the outside option of the workers should be included in equation (10). To
account for this potential omitted variable bias, we tested an alternative specification including among the
explanatory variables the sector unemployment rate and the sector mean hourly wage. The intuition behind this
choice is that when the sector unemployment rate diminishes, the probability of finding a job elsewhere goes up
and therefore wage claims increase. In contrast, a drop in the expected alternative wage mitigates envy effects
and wage claims. Findings (available upon request) show that the inclusion of these variables in our wage
regressions has no impact on the wage-profit elasticity.
32 This has been done by applying the “cluster” option in Stata (StataCorp, 1999). Another potential issue is that
cross-sectional data do not allow to control for the fact that more profitable firms may employ workers with
better unobserved abilities. Yet, “even with panel data, Martins (2003) does not include firm fixed effects, and
attempts to do so by Abowd et al. (1999) and Margolis and Salvanes (2001) have relied on the exogeneity of35
Table 9: Rent-Sharing at Different Percentiles of the Wage Distribution
(Dependent variable: Ln of individual gross hourly wages including annual bonuses)
Explanatory variables / Model: OLS
1 IV
      (2SLS)
1, 2































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics
6 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects
7 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R² / Pseudo R² 0.719 0.712 0.414 0.478 0.538







Lester (1952) range of wages
(per cent)
18.0 40.6 / / /
Number of observations 34,972 34,972 34,972 34,972 34,972
Number of groups 1,501 1,501 1,501 1,501 1,501
Notes:
1 White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported between brackets.
2 The
instruments used in the IV regressions (besides the exogenous variables in equation (10)) include: per capita firm
level value added and per capita total amount of goods and services purchased by the firm.
3 Firm annual gross
operating surplus per worker.
4 Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance components
within groups developed by Over, Jolliffe and Foster (1996) preprogrammed in the “cluster” option of Stata
(StataCorp, 1999).
5 Dummy for gender; 6 dummies for education; prior potential experience, its square and its
cube; seniority within the current company and its square; dummy variable indicating whether the individual
supervises other workers; a variable showing whether the individual received a bonus for shift work, night work
and/or weekend work, a dummy for overtime paid, 3 dummies for the type of contract and 23 occupational
dummies.
6 Region where the establishment is located (2 dummies), size of the establishment (i.e. number of
workers), and level of wage bargaining (2 dummies).
7 Two-digit industry dummies for quantile regressions and
three-digit industry dummies otherwise.
8 n*R’² and associated (p-value). **/*/°: coefficient significant at the 1,
5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
Our findings, reported in column (1) of Table 9
33, show that the OLS estimate of Ȝ, i.e. the
elasticity between wages and profits-per-worker, is significant at the 1 per cent level and
equal to 0.028. This means that on average a doubling of profits-per-worker increases
earnings ceteris paribus by 2.8 per cent. To evaluate the impact of profits on the distribution
of wages, Lester’s (1952) range of pay due to rent-sharing can be calculated. This statistic
individual moves between firms – an obviously questionable assumption that introduces other biases (Winter-
Ebmer and Zweimueller, 1999)” (Fakhfakh and FitzRoy, 2004: 618).
33 Detailed results for the 2SLS are presented in Appendix 16. Full results of the quantile regressions with IV can
be obtained upon request.36
estimates the fraction of the overall wage inequality that is due to the variability in profits-
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where O ˆ  is the estimated wage-profit elasticity,
L
3 measures the level of firm profits-per-
worker, and   L
3 V  and
L
3 denote the standard deviation and the mean value of
L
3 ,
respectively. On the basis of this formula, it appears that about 18 per cent of the variance in
individual wages is due to the variability in profits.
34 To put it another way, given that the
mean hourly wage (including bonuses) stands at 13.46 EUR, rent sharing explains the
variation of wages between 11.04 and 15.88 EUR.
Although these results seem quite accurate, they suffer from the endogeneity of profits.
Indeed, by construction wages have a negative impact on profits. Therefore, OLS estimates
are biased and inconsistent. To overcome this problem, we re-estimated our model using the
method of instrumental variables. This method consists in finding instruments, which are at
the same time highly correlated with the endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the error
term. We used as instruments for profits all exogenous variables of equation (10), plus per
capita firm level value added and per capita total amount of goods and services purchased by
the firm. The sum of the latter variables corresponds to the firm level value of production per
worker. As suggested by Margolis and Salvanes (2001: 16), one might think of sales (or
production) per worker, conditional on the sector being correctly identified, as a measure of
the firm’s market power.
35 Results of our 2SLS regression are presented in column (2) of
Table 9. Not surprisingly, we find that the wage-profit elasticity increases from 0.028 to
0.063, which confirms the downward biasness of our previous estimates.
36 It follows that
Lester’s range of pay is about 40.6 per cent of the mean wage. Yet, it could be argued that the
34 Notice that [0.028 x 4 (34.11/21.18)] x100 is equal to 18.0 per cent.
35 Other instruments used in the literature to control for the endogeneity of profits include e.g. output elasticity,
interaction of share of exports with exchange rate and lagged profits.
36 All coefficients in the first-stage regression are jointly significant at the 1 per cent level. Results are available
upon request.37
instruments that have been used are inappropriate. To check for this, Sargan’s (1964) over-
identification test has been applied. The corresponding test statistic is computed as nR’²,
where n is the number of observations and R’² is the per cent of variation explained in the
regression of the residuals from the second-stage equation on the instruments and all
exogenous variables in the model. This statistic is distributed F² with degrees of freedom
equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions (in this case, df = 2). The results of this
test, presented at the bottom of column (2) in Table 9, show that the overidentifying
restrictions can not be rejected at the level of 15 per cent. This suggests that our instruments
are valid and that our model is well specified.
Finally, in order to analyse whether the remuneration from profits fluctuates along the
conditional wage distribution, we ran simultaneous quantile regressions (at the 10th, 50th and
90th percentiles) controlling for the endogeneity of profits. Results from these regressions are
reported in columns (3) to (5) of Table 9. They indicate that the elasticity between wages and
profits increases from 0.048 at the 10th percentile of the wage distribution to 0.079 at the 90th
percentile. To put it differently, it is found that workers at the top end of the wage distribution
gain significantly more from firm profits than those at the bottom of the wage distribution.
7.3. Industry Wage Premia Before and After Controlling for Rent-Sharing
So far, results have shown that individual hourly wages are significantly and positively related
to firm profits-per-employee. In this sub-section, we examine to what extend industry wage
differentials are explained by this rent-sharing phenomenon. To do so, we compare the
significance, magnitude and dispersion of industry wage premia before and after controlling
for the elasticity between wages and (instrumented) profits. In other words, we compare
results obtained from a wage equation that does only control for individual and firm
characteristics (see equation (1)) with those of an earnings equation that does also control for
firm profits-per-capita (see equation (10)).38
Table 10: Industry Wage Premia Before and After Controlling for Rent-Sharing, 1995
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Adjusted R² of wage regression 0.697 0.697
F-test relative to the wage regression 555.3** 56,392.1**
F-test relative to the sectoral dummies 80.9** 71.1**




Range of industry wage differentials 0.521 0.366
Weighted adjusted standard deviation (WASD) of the
inter-industry differentials 0.068 0.048
Correlation coefficient between industry wage differentials estimated





Number of industries 38 38
Number of observations 34,972 34,972
Notes: Industry wage differentials in column (1) and (2) are estimated on the basis of equations (1) and (10)
respectively, with dependent variable the ln of individual gross hourly wages including annual bonuses. Standard
errors of the industry wage differentials, computed according to Zanchi (1998), are reported between brackets.
**/*/°: industry wage differential significant at the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
Results reported in Table 10 show that substantial wage differentials are still recorded
between workers employed in different sectors after controlling for profits. However, the
percentage significant industry wage differentials (at the 5 per cent level) decreases from
around 75 to 50 per cent. We further note that the hierarchy of sectors in terms of wages
remains almost unchanged. Indeed, Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between
the wage differentials estimated with and without control for profits stands at between 0.75
and 0.89. Among the best-paying sectors we still find the post and telecommunications sector;
the electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply sector; the manufacture of coke, refined
petroleum products and nuclear fuel industry; and the water transport sector. However, the
wage premium in these sectors decreases by between 19 and 47 per cent when controlling for40
profits. Furthermore it is still in the traditional sectors (e.g. hotels and restaurants, the textile
industry and retailing), that wages are lowest. Yet, the estimated wage disadvantage of
working in these sectors is substantially reduced when controlling for profits. Last but not
least, we find that the dispersion in industry wage differentials (the WASD) drops by almost
one-third when profits are taken into account. These findings offer some clear evidence for




In this paper, we wanted to shed some light on the magnitude, stability and causes of inter-
industry wage differentials in Belgium. To do so, four central questions have been addressed:
i) Are sectoral differences in pay a temporary phenomenon or do they persist over time ?, ii)
Do they derive from sectoral differences in the unobserved quality of the labour force ?, iii)
To what extent are they shaped by the sectors’ ‘ability to pay’, i.e. profits ?, iii) What is the
contribution of rent-sharing to the observed industry wage differentials ? These questions
have been investigated on the basis of a unique matched employer-employee data set covering
the period 1995-2002. This data set derives from the combination of the Structure of Earnings
Survey and the Structure of Business Survey. The former contains detailed information on
firm characteristics (e.g. sector of activity, size of the firm, and level of wage bargaining) and
on individual workers (e.g. gross hourly wages, bonuses, age, education, sex, and occupation).
The latter provides firm- and sector-level information on financial variables (e.g. gross
operating surplus, value added, and value of production).
Our findings show the existence of substantial and persistent wage differentials among
workers having the same observed characteristics and working conditions, employed in
different sectors. The best paying industry over the period 1995-2002 is the electricity, gas,
steam and hot water supply sector. Depending on the period considered, the average worker in
this sector earns ceteris paribus between 27 and 31 per cent more than the average worker in
the whole economy. At the top of the conditional wage distribution, we also find the
manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel industry (between +20 and
34 per cent), the air transport sector (between +12 and 19 per cent), the manufacture of
37 Results at the Nace three-digit level, reported in the Appendix 17, reinforce this conclusion.41
chemicals and chemical products industry (between +11 and 12 per cent), and financial
intermediaries, except insurance and pension funding (between +6 and 13 per cent). The hotel
and restaurant sector is at the very bottom of the wage scale: the average worker’s wage there
is ceteris paribus between 11 and 14 per cent lower than that of the average worker in the
economy. At the bottom of the scale, we also find the manufacture of wearing apparel,
dressing and dyeing of fur (between -11 and -13 per cent), retail trade (between -7 and -12 per
cent), the manufacture of furniture (between -8 and -10 per cent), and the manufacture of
textiles (between -4 and -8 per cent).
Regarding the dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials, we find that Belgium occupies a
middle position among the industrialised countries. The scale of the latter is indeed lower than
in the Anglo-Saxon countries and higher than in the Scandinavian countries. Yet, it appears
that the dispersion of wages across sectors in Belgium has steadily decreased between 1995
and 2002. The explanation for this evolution is still unsettled. However, it could be related to
the European integration process or the deregulation of certain industries.
Industry wage differentials may of course derive from the fact that the unobserved quality of
the labour force is not randomly distributed across sectors. In other words, high-paying
industries might simply be those in which the unobserved quality of the labour force is the
highest. This potential explanation has been tested with Martins’ (2004) methodology. The
latter implies to verify, on the basis of quantile regressions, whether sectors with high average
premia have even higher premia among high wage workers. Empirical results show that the
unobserved ability hypothesis may not be rejected. However, its contribution to the observed
industry wage differentials appears to be limited. The role of non-competitive forces should
therefore not be neglected.
The most natural non-competitive explanation for the existence of industry wage premia is
that they result from inter-sectoral variations in ‘ability to pay’, i.e. profits. This explanation
has been tested using simple correlation coefficients and cross-sectional regressions. Results
show that industry wage premia are significantly and positively correlated with industry
profits, in all periods, both at the Nace two- and three digit level. They thus support the
hypothesis that that industry wage premia derive at least partly from the heterogeneity in
sectoral profits. Yet, they are consistent with several explanations going beyond the standard
competitive model, including efficiency wage theory and rent-sharing.42
The magnitude of rent-sharing in the Belgian private sector and its contribution to the
observed industry wage differentials has been examined in the last section of this paper.
Empirical results show first that individual gross hourly wages are significantly and positively
related to firm profits-per-employee, even after controlling for group effects in the residuals,
individual and firm characteristics, industry wage differentials, and endogeneity of profits.
The instrumented wage-profit elasticity estimated at the mean is equal to 0.063. However,
workers at the top end of the wage distribution are found to gain significantly more from
profits than those at the bottom of the wage distribution. Further results show that substantial
wage differentials are still recorded between workers employed in different sectors after
controlling for rent-sharing. However, the proportion of significant industry wage premia
decreases from around 75 to 50 per cent. We also find that the dispersion in industry wage
differentials drops by almost one-third when profits are taken into account. These findings
suggest that rent-sharing accounts for a large fraction of the industry wage differentials.
Future research in this area should rely on matched employer-employee panel data so as to
control for the time-invariant unobserved characteristics of the workers. Longitudinal data
would in particular allow to measure how much of the cross-sectional inter-industry wage
differentials is removed by the introduction of fixed effects. Unfortunately, at present these
data do not exist for Belgium.43
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1: Description and Means (S.D.) of Selected Variables (SES 1995, 1999, 2002).
SES  1995  SES  1999  SES  2002
Gross hourly wage, including bonuses: (in EUR) includes overtime
paid, premiums for shift work, night work and/or weekend work
and bonuses (i.e. irregular payments which do not occur during







Gross hourly wage, excluding bonuses: (in EUR) includes overtime












Higher non-university short type, higher artistic training























Prior potential experience: (years), experience (potentially)
accumulated on the labour market before the last job. It has be





















Female (yes) 31.4 30.3 32.0
Overtime paid (yes) 7.3 3.8 2.1
Bonuses for shift work, night work and/or weekend work (yes) 15.1 14.9 14.1




















Managers of small enterprises (P13)
Physical, mathematic and engineer science professionals
(P21)
Life science and health professionals (P22)
Teaching professionals (P23)
Other professionals (P24)
Physical and engineer science associate professionals (P31)
Life science and health associate professionals (P32)
Teaching associate professionals (P33)
Other associate professionals (P34)
Office clerks (P41)
Customer services clerks (P42)
Personal and protective services workers (P51)
Models, salespersons and demonstrators (P52)
Extraction and building trading workers (P71)
Metal, machinery and related trades workers (P72)
Precision, handicraft, printing workers (P73)
Other craft and related trades workers (P74)
Stationary plant and related operators (P81)
Machine operators and assemblers (P82)
Drivers and mobile plant operators (P83)
Sales and services elementary occupations (P91)



































































transport (P93) 7.3 5.6 6.2



















Level of wage bargaining:
    Collective agreement only at the national and/or sectoral level











Number of observations 67,023 108,677 102,594
Notes: The descriptive statistics refer to the weighted sample. Descriptive statistics relative to the sectoral
affiliation of the workers are available on request.49
APPENDIX 2: Description and Means (S.D.) of Selected Variables (SES-SBS 1995)
SES-SBS 1995
Gross hourly wage: (in EUR) includes overtime paid, premiums for shift work,
night work and/or weekend work and bonuses (i.e. irregular payments which





Profits-per-worker: (in thousands of EUR) approximated by the firm annual gross
operating surplus per worker. The gross operating surplus corresponds to the









Higher non-university short type, higher artistic training









Prior potential experience: (years), experience (potentially)
  accumulated on the labour market before the last job. It has be
  computed as follows: age – 6 – years of education – seniority.
9.2
(8.2)
Seniority in the current company: (years). 10.1
(8.9)
Hours: number of hours paid in the reference period, including overtime paid. 160.2
(28.7)
Female (yes) 28.6
Overtime paid (yes) 9.3
Bonuses for shift work, night work and/or weekend work (yes) 21.0












Managers of small enterprises (P13)
Physical, mathematic and engineer science professionals (P21)
Life science and health professionals (P22)
Teaching professionals (P23)
Other professionals (P24)
Physical and engineer science associate professionals (P31)
Life science and health associate professionals (P32)
Teaching associate professionals (P33)
Other associate professionals (P34)
Office clerks (P41)
Customer services clerks (P42)
Personal and protective services workers (P51)
Models, salespersons and demonstrators (P52)
Extraction and building trading workers (P71)
Metal, machinery and related trades workers (P72)
Precision, handicraft, printing workers (P73)
Other craft and related trades workers (P74)
Stationary plant and related operators (P81)
Machine operators and assemblers (P82)
Drivers and mobile plant operators (P83)
Sales and services elementary occupations (P91)
























Size of the establishment: number of workers. 645.5
(1,331.5)50







Level of wage bargaining:
    Collective agreement only at the national and/or sectoral level





Number of observations 34,972
Notes: The descriptive statistics refer to the weighted sample. Descriptive statistics relative to the sectoral
affiliation of the workers are available on request.51
APPENDIX 3: Gross Hourly Wages (Including Bonuses) and Employment Shares for























































































0 € 10 € 20 € 30 € 40 € 50 €
Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply (40)
Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security (66)
Renting of machinery and equipment (71)
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments (33)
Real estate activities (70)
Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding (65)
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (24)
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation (67)
Manufacture of basic metals (27)
Computer and related activities (72)
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (23)
Research and development (73)
Manufacture of tobacco products  (16)
Other businesses activities (74)
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34)
Retail trade; repair of personal and household goods (52)
Supporting transport activities; travel agencies (63)
Manufacture of office machinery and computers (30)
Wholesale trade and commission trade  (51)
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (26)
Manufacture of radio & television equipment (32)
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media (22)
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. (31)
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products (21)
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. (36)
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products (25)
Other mining and quarrying (14)
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (29)
Manufacture of fabricated metal products (28)
Manufacture of other transport equipment (35)
Construction (45)
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (50)
Air transport (62)
Recycling (37)
Post and telecommunications (64)
Water transport (61)
Manufacture of food products and beverages (15)
Manufacture of textiles (17)
Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork  (20)
Hotels and restaurants (55)
Land transport; transport via pipelines (60)
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur (18)
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage (19)
0% 3% 5% 8% 10% 13% 15% 18% 20%
Gross hourly wages, including bonuses (EUR) Employment shares (%)
Source: Structure of Earnings Survey, 1995.52
APPENDIX 4: Earnings Equations, Including Annual Bonuses (SES 1995, 2002).



































































Unlimited-term employment contract Reference Reference






























Supervises the work of co-workers (Yes) 0.113**
(0.004)
/




Level of wage bargaining
Collective agreement only at the national and/or sectoral level Reference Reference53












Adjusted R² 0.733 0.662
F-test 612.7** 490.0**
Number of observations 67,023 102,594
Notes: White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are reported between brackets.
**/*/°: coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.54
APPENDIX 5: Inter-Industry Wage Differentials and their Dispersion, Excluding Annual
Bonuses, Nace 3-Digit (SES 1995, 1999, 2002).
Industry (Nace 3-digit) / Data set: SES  1995  SES  1999  SES  2002
Mining and agglomeration of hard coal (101) / / -0.129**
(0.026)
Extraction and agglomeration of peat (103) / / -0.174**
(0.033)


























































































































Manufacture of leather clothes (181) / -0.174**
(0.016)
/






































Manufacture of veneer sheets; manufacture of plywood, laminboard,



















Manufacture of other products of wood; manufacture of articles of cork,















































































Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing





































Manufacture of non-refractory ceramic goods other than for


































Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone (267) 0.029 0.080** 0.01156
(0.021) (0.019) (0.020)










































Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal; manufacture









































Manufacture of machinery for the production and use of mechanical





























































































Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line







Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording  -0.101** -0.040** 0.029°57
or reproducing apparatus and associated goods (323) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015)








Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking,
































Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of































































































































































































































































































Transport via railways (601) / / 0.129**
(0.036)






























Space transport (623) 0.036
(0.051)
/ /






































































































































































Legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax
consultancy; market research and public opinion polling; business and















































Adjusted R² of wage regression 0.713 0.659 0.627
F-test relative to the estimated wage regression 535.5** 479.5** 405.0**
F-test relative to the sectoral dummies 50.8** 56.6** 51.22**






Range of industry wage differentials 0.599 0.552 0.570
Weighted adjusted standard deviation (WASD) of the inter-industry
differentials
0.084 0.080 0.072
Number of industries 175 172 180
Number of observations 67,023 108,677 102,594
Notes: Standard errors of the industry wage differentials, computed according to Zanchi (1998), are reported
between brackets. **/*/°: industry wage differential significant at the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.61
APPENDIX 6: Inter-Industry Wage Differentials and their Dispersion, Including Annual
Bonuses, Nace 2-digit (SES 1995, 2002).
Industry (NACE 2-digit) / Data set: SES 1995 SES 2002
Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat (10) / -0.173**
(0.023)




Manufacture of food products and beverages (15) 0.002
(0.006)
/












Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags,





Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture;

























































































Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail











Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal















































Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal

















Adjusted R² of wage regression 0.720 0.649
F-test relative to the estimated relation 1,350.6** 1,071.0**
F-test relative to the sectoral dummies 165.1** 171.0**




Range of industry wage differentials 0.462 0.554
Weighted adjusted standard deviation (WASD) of the
inter-industry differentials 0.081 0.074
Number of industries 43 44
Number of observations 67,023 102,594
Notes: Standard errors of the industry wage differentials, computed according to Zanchi (1998), are reported
between brackets. **/*/°: industry wage differential significant at the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.63
APPENDIX 7: Inter-Industry Wage Differentials and their Dispersion, Including Annual
Bonuses, Nace 3-digit (SES 1995, 2002).
Industry (Nace 3-digit) / Data set: SES 1995 SES 2002
Mining and agglomeration of hard coal (101) / -0158**
(0.030)
Extraction and agglomeration of peat (103) / -0.178**
(0.034)












































































































Manufacture of veneer sheets; manufacture of plywood, laminboard, particle













Manufacture of other products of wood; manufacture of articles of cork, straw





















Reproduction of recorded media (223) / 0.029
(0.041)
































Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations,

























Manufacture of non-refractory ceramic goods other than for construction

































Manufacture of tubes (272) / 0.053**
(0.014)


















Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal; manufacture of central

























Manufacture of machinery for the production and use of mechanical power,































































Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony





Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or











Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing,



























































































Collection, purification and distribution of water (410) / 0.246**
(0.086)
























































































































Transport via railways (601) / 0.091*
(0.038)




















Space transport (623) 0.057
(0.061) /














































































































Legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy; market


















Labour recruitment and provision of personnel (745) -0.102** 0.066**69
(0.015) (0.021)












Adjusted R² of wage regression 0.733 0.662
F-test relative to the estimated wage regression 612.7** 490.0**
F-test relative to the sectoral dummies 163.1** 64.67**
Per cent significant industry wage differentials at the 10% level 71.4% 72.8%
Range of industry wage differentials 0.755 0.785
Weighted adjusted standard deviation (WASD) of the inter-industry differentials 0.098 0.089
Number of industries 175 180
Number of observations 67,023 102,594
Notes: Standard errors of the industry wage differentials, computed according to Zanchi (1998), are reported
between brackets. **/*/°: industry wage differential significant at the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
APPENDIX 8: Pearson / Spearman Correlation Coefficients Between Industry Wage
Differentials, Excluding Annual Bonuses, Nace 3-digit (SES 1995, 1999, 2002)
SES 1995 SES 2002




SES 2002 0.709** / 0.703**
(n = 174)
Notes: n stands for the number of observations/sectors.
**/*/°: correlation coefficient significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
APPENDIX 9: Pearson / Spearman Correlation Coefficients Between Industry Wage
Differentials, Including Annual Bonuses, Nace 2- and 3-digit (SES 1995, 2002)
SES 2002
Nace 2-digit 0.796** / 0.729**
(n = 42)
SES 1995
Nace 3-digit 0.700** / 0.658**
(n = 174)
Notes: n stands for the number of observations/sectors.
**/*/°: correlation coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.70
Appendix 10: Industry Coefficients along the Distribution and their Difference, Nace 2-
digit, Including Annual Bonuses (SES 1995)





































Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage,







Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork, except






















































































Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments,











































Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 0.064** 0.047** -0.01771
retail sale of automotive fuel (50) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015)










































































Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of

























Means 0.075 0.170 0.056
Average difference for the 15 best-paying industries 0.097
Average difference for the 15 worse-paying industries 0.026
Per cent significant coefficients at the 5 per cent level 83.3% 83.3% 50.0%
Correlation between OLS and QR coefficients (Spearman) 0.783** 0.934** 0.253
Correlation between OLS and QR coefficients (Pearson) 0.749** 0.939** 0.471**
Notes: Industry wage coefficients are estimated on the basis of equation (1) where the dependent variable is the
ln of individual gross hourly wages including annual bonuses. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported between
brackets (1000 iterations). **/*/°: coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.72
APPENDIX 11: Correlation between Industry Wage Differentials and Industry
Profitability along the Conditional Wage distribution.
Nace 2-digit Nace 3-digit
1995 OLS Pearson






                 Spearman
0.590**
0.544** /
 Q90            Pearson











                 Spearman
0.393*
0.498** /
 Q90            Pearson
                 Spearman
0.603**
0.590** /
Notes: Data on industry profitability are drawn from the Structure of Business Survey. The industry profitability
has been estimated by the industry level gross operating surplus per employee. Industry wage differentials have
been computed on the basis of equation (1) where the dependent variable is the ln of gross hourly wages
including annual bonuses. **/*/°: coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
APPENDIX 12: Estimated Industry Wage Differentials against Industry Profitability,
Including Annual Bonuses, Nace 3-digit (SES 1995, 2002)

















Dummy for 1995 / / Reference /
Dummy for 2002 / / -0.001
(0.011)
/
F-test 49.72** 21.03** 33.42** 1.27
Adjusted R² 0.270 0.124 0.191 0.197
Number of observations 133 143 276 276
Notes: Industry wage differentials (at the Nace 3-digit level) are the dependent variable. They have been
computed on the basis of equation (1) where the explained variable is the ln of gross hourly wage including
annual bonuses. The industry profitability has been estimated by the industry level gross operating surplus per
employee. White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported between brackets. **/*/°:
coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.73
APPENDIX 13: Estimated Industry Wage Differentials against Industry Profitability,
Including Annual Bonuses, Nace 2-digit (SES 1995, 2002)



















Dummy for 1995 / / Reference /
Dummy for 2002 / / -0.021
(0.020)
/
F-test 12.02** 23.52** 16.88** 0.73
Adjusted R² 0.225 0.372 0.292 0.300
Number of observations 39 39 78 78
Notes: Industry wage differentials (at the Nace two-digit level) are the dependent variable. They have been
computed on the basis of equation (1) where the explained variable is the ln of gross hourly wage including
annual bonuses. The industry profitability has been estimated by the industry level gross operating surplus per
employee. White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported between brackets. **/*/°:
coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
APPENDIX 14: Estimated Industry Wage Differentials against Industry Profitability,
Excluding Annual Bonuses, Nace 2-digit (SES 1995, 1999, 2002)























Dummy for 1995 / / / Reference /
Dummy for 1999 / / / -0.011
(0.016)
/
Dummy for 2002 / / / -0.022
(0.016)
/
F-test 9.34** 19.72** 23.91** 15.75** 5.61*
Adjusted R² 0.18 0.33 0.376 0.276 0.283
Number of observations 39 39 39 117 117
Notes: Industry wage differentials (at the Nace two-digit level) are the dependent variable. They have been
computed on the basis of equation (1) where the explained variable is the ln of gross hourly wage excluding
annual bonuses. The industry profitability has been estimated by the industry level gross operating surplus per
employee. White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported between brackets. **/*/°:
coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.74
APPENDIX 15: Estimated Industry Wage Differentials against Industry Profitability





















































Dummy for 1995 / / Reference / / / Reference /
Dummy for 2002 / / -0.004
(0.018)
/ / / -0.027
(0.025)
/
F-test 20.28** 7.24** 10.68** 0.02 6.13* 22.15** 12.18** 0.58
Adjusted R² 0.337 0.138 0.199 0.219 0.119 0.352 0.223 0.231
Number of
observations
39 40 79 79 39 40 79 40
Notes: Industry wage differentials (at the Nace two-digit level) are the dependent variable. They have been
computed on the basis of equation (1) where the explained variable is the ln of gross hourly wage including
annual bonuses. The industry profitability has been estimated by the industry level gross operating surplus per
employee. White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported between brackets. **/*/°:
coefficient significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.75












































































Unlimited-term employment contract Reference Reference



































Level of wage bargaining
CA only at the national and/or sectoral level Reference Reference








Industry effects (149 dummies) Yes Yes
Group effects No Yes
Number of groups (i.e. firms) / 1,501




Adjusted R² 0.714 0.712
F-test 275.2** 512.1**
Number of observations 34,972 34,972
Notes: The dependent variable is the (Naperian) logarithm of the individual gross hourly wages (including
annual bonuses). White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are reported between brackets.
Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance components within groups proposed by
Greenwald (1983) and Moulton (1990). Instruments for profits include per capita firm level value added (at
factor costs) and per capita total amount of goods and services purchased by the firm.
a Approximated by the
firm annual gross operating surplus per worker.
bNR’² and associated (p-value). **/*/°: coefficient significant at
the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.77
APPENDIX 17: Inter-Industry Wage Differentials and their Dispersion, Nace 3-digit, with
and without Profits (SES-SBS 1995)














Mining of chemical and fertiliser minerals (143) / /






































































































Manufacture of veneer sheets; manufacture of plywood, laminboard,













Manufacture of other products of wood; manufacture of articles of





















Manufacture of coke oven products (231) / /




























Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing

























Manufacture of non-refractory ceramic goods other than for






















































Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal;































Manufacture of machinery for the production and use of mechanical





























Manufacture of office machinery and computers (300) / /
































Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for





Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video











Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking,
























Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture





























Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c. (355) / /








Manufacture of musical instruments (363) / /
Manufacture of sports goods (364) / /
















Production and distribution of electricity (401) / /






Collection, purification and distribution of water (410) / /


















Renting of construction or demolition equipment with operator (455) / /












Sale, maintenance and repair of motorcycles and related parts and
accessories (504)
/ /






























Other wholesale (517) / /


















Retail sale of second-hand goods in stores (525) / /
























Transport via railways (601) / /




















Space transport (623) / /


























Monetary intermediation (651) / /
Other financial intermediation (652) / /
Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
(660)
/ /
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation, except insurance and
pension funding (671)
/ /
Activities auxiliary to insurance and pension funding (672) / /
Real estate activities with own property (701) / /
Letting of own property (702) / /82
Real estate activities on a fee or contract basis (703) / /




























Data base activities (724) / /






Other computer related activities (726) / /






Research and experimental development on social sciences and
humanities (732)
/ /
Legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax
consultancy; market research and public opinion polling; business



































Adjusted R² of the wage regression 0.714 0.712
F-test relative to the estimated wage regression 275.2** 512.1**
F-test relative to the sectoral dummies 35.1** 29.2**




Range of industry wage differentials 0.692 0.671
Weighted adjusted standard deviation (WASD) of the inter-industry
differentials
0.090 0.062
Correlation coefficient between industry wage differentials estimated





Number of industries 150 150
Number of observations 34,972 34,972
Notes: Standard errors of the industry wage differentials, computed according to Zanchi (1998), are reported between
brackets.
a Industry wage coefficients are estimated on the basis of equation (1) where the dependent variable is the ln of
individual gross hourly wages including annual bonuses.
b Industry wage coefficients are estimated on the basis of equation
(10) where the dependent variable is the ln of individual gross hourly wages including annual bonuses. Instruments for profits
include per capita firm level value added (at factor costs) and per capita total amount of goods and services purchased by the
firm. **/*/°: industry wage differential significant at the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 90 - OCTOBER 2006 83
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